L Introduction
In 1823, the Supreme Court addressed its first federal Indian question in Johnson v. McIntosh,' and since McIntosh, the Court has decided numerous federal Indian questions. Indeed, in the past thirty years, the Supreme Court on average has addressed five federal Indian cases each term.
2 Overall, in the 175 years since McIntosh, the Supreme Court's holdings in federal Indian cases have ranged from favorable to devastating, and throughout this period, scholars have sought to coherently analyze many of these conflicting decisions.
David Wilkins, in his book American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S. Supreme Court, is the latest scholar who has attempted to analyze the perplexing field of federal Indian law. Wilkins employs critical legal and historical analysis in evaluating fifteen of the Supreme Court's federal Indian decisions? In so doing, Wilkins claims that such analysis "should go far toward explaining why and how the Court arrived at these important Indian law decisions" and should lead to a discussion addressing the "larger issue of why the core democratic concepts of fairness, justice, and consent of the governed have not yet been fully realized for tribal nations and their citizens despite clearly pronounced treaty rights, federal policies of Indian selfdetermination and tribal self-governance, positive judicial precedents, and a triple citizenship" (p. 5).
Unfortunately, by analyzing only fifteen cases -many of which are not very well known 4 -through the lenses of critical legal analysis, the author fails to adequately discern the issues he has sought to highlight. The author's analysis is misguided for two reasons. First, the author fails to demonstrate that his theory holds true in favorable as well as unfavorable Indian law decisions.' Second, the author fails to examine in any great length the historical context in which the cases were penned. This article, after evaluating Wilkins' analysis, proposes that Indian law decisions should be examined in light of the historical and political context in which they arose.
Part II details Wilkins' misguided critical legal and historic analysis of the fifteen Supreme Court decisions. Part III denotes Wilkins' missteps by exploring the Supreme Court's treatment of federalism and Indian law. Part IV concludes by stressing that federal Indian opinions decided by the Supreme Court should be examined and evaluated in light of the historical and political context in which they arose.
II. Wilkins, Critical Legal Analysis, and the Supreme Court

A. Legal Consciousness and Critical Legal Analysis
Wilkins first outlines several broad areas of legal consciousness that the Supreme Court has employed when deciding federal Indian questions. First, in Wilkins' opinion, the Supreme Court has analyzed federal Indian questions in light of constitutional or treaty considerations (pp. 10-11). The author states with :regard to this premise that:
The basic assumption of this legal consciousness is that constitutional or treaty considerations (i.e., ratified treaties or agreements) are the only relevant instruments for the adjudication of a legal dispute between tribes and the federal/ state governments. This consciousness is evident in Supreme Court opinions dealing with tribal sovereignty Which generally acknowledge the inherent sovereignty of tribal nations and their pre-and extraconstitutional aboriginal rights of self-government. (p. 10).
Second, in Wilkins' opinion, the Supreme Court has analyzed federal Indian questions in light of the United States' duty to "civilize" American Indians (pp. 11-14) . According to Wilkins, the Supreme Court has sanctioned paternalistic federal policies and, by so doing, has elevated the law to become an "effective instrument for civilizing indigenous peoples who are considered culturally inferior" (p. 11). Wilkins states that this consciousness is evident when the Supreme Court sanctioned Congress' assimilationist policies at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century (pp. 13-14). Wilkins also notes that although the Supreme Court, over the years, has served "predominantly as a legitimator of congressional and executive actions," the Court has employed certain legal concepts that have gone beyond justifying congressional action (p. 302)." In some cases, the author argues that the Supreme Court has relied on an implied congressional intent to deny
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Indians and tribes justice (p. 302). At other times, Wilkins maintains that the
Court has contrived "a scenario in which it pits one law or treaty provision against another and then 'chooses' the one most likely to effect whatever political ends it is striving to accomplish" (pp. 302-03). (pp. 2-3). Many academicians find fault with critical legal studies analysis because they view critical legal studies analysis as an overstated critique of legal doctrimne. Indeed, Wilkins' analysis is overstated in numerous ways, and one of the more obvious is his failure to discuss his critique of the law within a historical context. Wilkins acknowledges from the outset that he intends to demythologize the law "by focusing upon the broad institutional, societal, and, most important, historical effects of the Court's very political activities" (pp. PRIMER 175 (1994) . Other criticisms of the current legal system that have been advanced by critical legal studies scholars include "indeterminacy of legal doctrine; ... ; doctrine and procedure structured to obscure the political aspects of law; protection of the interests of the dominant under the guise of neutrality." l 19. See infra note 22 and accompanying text for more on overstating legal doctrine and the critical legal studies movement.
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20. KUKLIN & STEMPLE, supra note 18, at 175. Critical legal studies analysis is also known "for exploring in detail purported contradictions that result from widely accepted but overstated concepts, such as the objective/subjective dichotomy, the separation of individual and community, the public/private distinction, the false choice between order and anarchy, and other dualities." Id.
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"it is impossible to understand how the coordinate branches of government arrive at policy decisions regarding the constitutional and treaty rights of American Indian tribes, and individuals constituting these tribes, without total immersion in a historic context" (p. ). Unfortunately, Wilkins does not heed his own advice, and his analysis proceeds to explore the historical context only if it tends to prove his analysis.
11I. Federal Indian Law, Federalism, and the Supreme Court
Wilkins asserts that federalism has been one of the legal masks that the Supreme Court has employed to deny Indians and Indian tribes justice (pp. 8-17). Wilins explains that federalism was used as a mask in the following ways:
The mask worn by the federalizing agents viewed the United States as the core unit such that nonfederal entities must either be absorbed or vanquished. The masks applied by the Court to the tribes divided them according to degree of "savagery," . . . into the assimilable and unassimilable, tribal nations that were deemed capable of being Americanized (from a Euro-American perspective) and joining the United States as separate, though integrated, political entities versus those mostly western tribes that were caricatured as "wild" and "uncivilized." In masking the legal process, Law was clearly an agent of national unity. During the late 1800s and well into the twentieth century, the Court rendered a number of decisions indicating a clear intent to dilute the extraconstitutional status of tribes by unilaterally declaring them "wards" of the government and disavowing their separate, independent status. The assertion of congressional power over tribal lands, resources, and rights is evidence of this nationalizing effort. (p. 16).
Wilkins' critique, however, seems to be overstated and misguided in many respects -a truism associated with critical legal analysis.' According to Wilkins' account, the Supreme Court used federalism in the late 1800s and early 1900s to justify the congressional policy of assimilation because the Court wanted to deny Indians and Indian tribes justice. Unfortunately, by falling to discuss the concept of federalism outside the aforementioned period, Wilkins does not address whether the Court has used the doctrine of [Vol. 23
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol23/iss2/9 federalism on an evenhanded basis. This inquiry is an important one because if the Court has used the doctrine of federalism on an evenhanded basis, then the Court may have afforded justice to Indians and Indian tribes under the doctrine of federalism. Therefore, the Court would not necessarily have been using federalism as a mask for justice during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
A. Federalism & The Early Supreme Court
By the time Chief Justice John Marshall had the opportunity to wrestle with the question of Indian affairs and its relationship with principles of federalism, he had already established himself as a devote federalist and nationalist.' Appointed by federalist-minded President John Adams, Chief Justice Marshall quickly established himself as the protector of federal principles, and, as such, Marshall penned his opinions to advance the federalist cause.' Indeed, by the time Chief Justice Marshall was presented with a case concerning federal-state-Indian relations, he had already written numerous decisions establishing federal supremacy over the states." 7 During the United States' early years, states tried to exert their powers over a number of different matters -many of which they knew they had voluntarily ceded to the federal government in the United States Constitution.' In the realm of Indian affairs, the states had given the federal government control over managing Indian relations. Nevertheless, some states tried to exert and retain control over Indian affairs?3
The desire of certain states to retain control over Indian affairs rested in the fact that the states' colonial predecessors had almost dominated control over Indian affairs.' During this period, the crown set the general policies, but the management of Indian policies generally was left to the separate colonies 2 As early as 1754, Benjamin Franklin had suggested that the colonies should form a union of colonies and centralize control over Indian affairs. 3 The very next year the British Crown also sought to centralize Indian affairs through the appointment of Indian agents directly responsible to London.' In 1781, the nation approved the Articles of Confederation in which article IX vested the Continental Congress with power to regulate trade and manage affairs with Indians, not members of any states? 5 States had residual authority over Indian affairs within their own states.' After the Revolution, the federal government tried to regulate Indian affairs; however, it encountered resistance from certain states -New York, North Carolina, and Georgia -when it sought to establish boundary lines with various tribes."
In 1789, the United States Constitution was adopted, and in the Constitution, the states delegated the power to regulate "Commerce... with the Indian tribes" to Congress." In 1790, Congress asserted its power when it enacted the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 which forbade the sale of land by any Indians within the United States to any person or state, unless done in a public treaty under U.S. authority. 9 After 1790, Congress continued to enact legislation designed to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes."'
The Supreme Court first addressed an Indian question in 1823 in Johnson v. McIntosh. 4 ' In McIntosh, the Supreme Court did not recognize a private purcha.e of land between a non-Indian and an Indian tribe. 42 In so doing, the Court gave federal sanction to the doctrine of discovery which declared that Indians held only a possessory use interest in the land and that the United States held legal title. 43 Though McIntosh primarily addressed the question of aboriginal land title, the decision, in terms of federalism, recognized the United States' right, not Indian tribes or states, to the land. Without this decision, the new federal government's power would have been severely limited because it would have encountered a legal quagmire in deciding the legitimacy of land titles in United States territory.
The Supreme Court next addressed an Indian question in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. In Cherokee Nation, the Cherokees brought suit in an effort to prevent Georgia from imposing its state laws within Cherokee Territory." Although Chief Justice Marshall refused to accept the case because he had 34. .5ee id. See ROBERT N. CULNTON ET AL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 141 (3d ed. 1991 https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol23/iss2/9 determined that the Cherokee Nation was not a foreign state which could sue Georgia in the United States courts, he held that the Cherokee Nation was a domestic dependent nation because it was a distinct political society capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself. In so doing, Chief Justice Marshall rejected the argument of state-rights Justices Baldwin and Johnson who sought to allow the state to impose laws over the Cherokee Nation.
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The very next year Chief Justice Marshall, in Worcester v. Georgia, ' used principles of federalism to protect the Cherokees from Georgia's attempt to impose its laws on the Cherokee Nation. In Worcester, a non-Indian was arrested for living within Cherokee Territory without permission from state authorities and was convicted for violating a Georgia law that required such permission.s The Supreme Court overturned the conviction and declared the statute unconstitutional. 49 In reaching this decision, the Court relied upon the constitutional doctrine that regulation of Indian affairs was granted to the federal government and not to the states."
B. The Supreme Court and the Post-Civil War Years
In 1883, in Ex parte Crow Dog,' Crow Dog killed another Indian. Federal authorities subsequently tried Crow Dog for murder.' Crow Dog argued that the federal government could not try him because the federal courts had no jurisdiction over Indian activities on the Lakota Reservation. The Supreme Court affirmed this argument because Congress had not enacted legislation giving it criminal jurisdiction over the tribes.' Congress reacted to Crow Dog by passing the Major Crimes Act of 1885 which gave federal courts jurisdiction over murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny!'
The 67 Although decisions made under this doctrine have not always been favorable to Indians or Indian tribes, the Supreme Court has applied the principles of federalism in a relatively consistent manner, and, as a result, one can reasonably conclude that the Supreme Court has not used the doctrine solely to mask injustice.'
IV. Conclusion
Wilkins' discussion of the Supreme Court's federal Indian holdings, though interesting and intriguing, is misguided. Wilkins' failure stems from his inability to "demythologize the law" in his evaluation of fifteen Supreme Court opinions -many of which were not well known and all of which, save one, were unfavorable rulings. Instead, of "demythologizing the law," Wilkins analysis actually mythologizes the law because he overstates his critique of legal doctrine and because he fails to discuss his critique within a historical and political context. Consequently, future analysis evaluating federal Indian opinions decided by the Supreme Court should be examined in light of the historical and political context in which they arose. 
